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Introduction 
Most living lawyers have run into Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent1 
in their legal education. It has long been a staple in Contracts 
casebooks.2 While the result has been widely applauded, in recent years 
there has been some push-back. Professor Kenneth Ching has recently 
criticized both Cardozo’s argument and the result.3 Professor Robert 
Scott in a number of papers, some coauthored, has also concluded that 
the result was wrong.4 Yet given the state of New York law at the time 
 
†  Jerome L. Greene Professor of Transactional Law, Columbia University 
School of Law. Thanks to Barbara Black, Rick Brooks, Mark Lawson, and 
Bob Scott for comments on an earlier draft of this paper 
1.  129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921). 
2. It is a main case in 24 of 25 Contracts casebooks. The outlier, Macaulay, et 
al, Contracts: Law in Action, has a lengthy discussion of the case at Volume 
I, p. 198 and Volume II, pp. 398-400. 
3. Kenneth K. Ching, Justice and Harsh Results: Beyond Individualism and 
Collectivism in Contracts, 45 U. Mem. L. Rev. 59, 62 (2014) (asserting 
that Cardozo was guilty of “material misrepresentations of fact and law”); 
Id. at 70–71 (footnote omitted) (“Generally, impugning a judge’s character 
should be avoided, but Cardozo’s claim that the contract is ‘silent’ is either 
negligent or dishonest.”). 
4. See Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott, Contract Design and the Structure 
of Contractual Intent, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1023, 1095–97 (2009) (stating 
that “commercial parties have sound reasons for creating express conditions, 
and thus courts have good reasons to enforce them”); see also Alan 
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Cardozo’s result was correct. Moreover, I will argue, the outcome is one 
that parties would adopt today. Ironically, despite the usual 
characterization of New York as being formalistic and having “hard” 
rules, its “soft” position on one question played a significant role. 
The core facts are simple. Kent, a very wealthy lawyer, hired Jacob 
& Youngs to build a mansion. The contract price was about $77,000.5 
The contract required that Kent make the final payment of $3,483.46 
upon the architect providing a certificate acknowledging completion.6 
The architect refused to award the certificate because the contract 
required that all the pipes be Reading Pipe, but a substantial amount 
of pipes installed were of other brands. The architect ordered that Jacob 
& Youngs replace the nonconforming pipe even though that would have 
required tearing down significant portions of the structure at a great 
cost. The contractor refused to do so, Kent refused to make the final 
payment, and Jacob & Youngs sued.7  
In a 4-3 decision, Cardozo held that the contractor had 
substantially performed and that the mistake was inadvertent. He 
stated: 
We think the evidence, if admitted, would have supplied some 
basis for the inference that the defect was insignificant in its 
relation to the project. The courts never say that one who makes 
a contract fills the measure of his duty by less than full 
performance. They do say, however, that an omission, both trivial 
and innocent, will sometimes be atoned for by allowance of the 
resulting damage, and will not always be the breach of a condition 
to be followed by a forfeiture.8  
Cardozo continued: “The willful transgressor must accept the penalty 
of his transgression. For him there is no occasion to mitigate the rigor 
of implied conditions. The transgressor whose default is unintentional 
 
Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract 
Law, 113 Yale L.J. 541, 615–16 (2003) (“When the parties adopt a 
sophisticated governance scheme, it is mistaken paternalism for a court to 
require a promisee to accept substantial performance.”); Alan Schwartz & 
Robert E. Scott, Market Damages, Efficient Contracting, and the Economic 
Waste Fallacy, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 1610 passim (2008) [hereinafter 
Schwartz & Scott, Market Damages]; Robert E. Scott, In (Partial) Defense 
of Strict Liability in Contract, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1381, 1384–87 (2009). 
5. Record on Appeal at 7, Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 
1921), reprinted in 3 Records and Briefs of Landmark Benjamin 
Cardozo Opinions (William H. Manz ed., 2001) [hereinafter Record]. 
The plumbing subcontract was for $6,020.50. Id. at 114. 
6.  Id. at 8. 
7.  See id. at 6–8 (discussing the circumstances leading to the lawsuit). 
8. Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 890 (N.Y. 1921). 
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and trivial may hope for mercy if he will offer atonement for his 
wrong.”9 A finding of substantial performance meant that the 
contractor would receive the final payment less an allowance: “In the 
circumstances of this case, we think the measure of the allowance is not 
the cost of replacement, which would be great, but the difference in 
value, which would be either nominal or nothing.”10 
McLaughlin, in dissent, painted a very different picture: “The 
plaintiff did not perform its contract. Its failure to do so was either 
intentional or due to gross neglect which, under the uncontradicted 
facts, amounted to the same thing, nor did it make any proof of the 
cost of compliance, where compliance was possible.”11 If the error were 
minor and inadvertent, he would have found that there had been 
substantial performance, but the deviation was neither. He rejected the 
contractor’s claim that the difference in value between Reading pipe 
and other pipe was either nominal or nothing.12 The contractor could 
not substitute something just as good. The dissent quoted at length an 
1858 decision, Smith v. Brady:13 
I suppose it will be conceded that every one has a right to build 
his house, his cottage or his store after such a model and in such 
style as shall best accord with his notions of utility or be most 
agreeable to his fancy. The specifications of the contract become 
the law between the parties until voluntarily changed. If the 
owner prefers a plain and simple Doric column, and has so 
provided in the agreement, the contractor has no right to put in 
its place the more costly and elegant Corinthian. If the owner, 
having regard to strength and durability, has contracted for walls 
of specified materials to be laid in a particular manner, or for a 
given number of joists and beams, the builder has no right to 
substitute his own judgment or that of others. Having departed 
from the agreement, if performance has not been waived by the 
other party, the law will not allow him to allege that he has made 
as good a building as the one he engaged to erect. He can demand 
payment only upon and according to the terms of his contract, 
and if the conditions on which payment is due have not been 
performed, then the right to demand it does not exist. To hold a 
different doctrine would be simply to make another contract, and 
 
9. Id. at 891 (citation omitted). 
10. Id. 
11. Id. at 892 (McLaughlin, J., dissenting). 
12.  Id.  
13. 17 N.Y. 173 (1858). 
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would be giving to parties an encouragement to violate their 
engagements, which the just policy of the law does not permit.14 
McLaughlin’s reference to the uncontradicted facts is misleading. The 
record contained almost no facts since the trial judge had not allowed 
any proof. The rejection of those facts was precisely the reason for the 
Appellate Division’s reversal.15 
The lack of facts was not for want of trying. Plaintiff’s counsel 
would ask: “Do you know X?” Answer: “Yes.” Question: “What is X?” 
Objection. Sustained.16 This pattern was repeated twenty times. So it 
is not surprising that the facts were uncontradicted. But the appeal was 
based on the Appellate Court’s finding that the facts (all 20 X’s) were 
wrongly excluded. The reversal was upon a question of law, not facts. 
McLaughlin just ignored the legal question and was content to rely on 
his characterization of the limited facts that had made it into the 
record.17 
Of course, Cardozo did not have the facts either. Yet unlike the 
Appellate Division, his decision did not simply remand for retrial. 
Professor Ching writes: 
Cardozo took the extremely aggressive approach of not merely 
remanding for a new trial, but of directing a verdict in favor of 
Jacob & Youngs, largely on the grounds that substantial 
performance had occurred. But how could Cardozo know 
substantial performance occurred? There was virtually no 
evidence on this very issue!18 
 
14. Id. at 186–187. 
15. Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 175 N.Y.S. 281, 282 (N.Y. App. Div. 1919) 
(“[T]he plaintiff offered evidence to establish that all the pipe used in 
completing the contract upon this building was well-galvanized, lap-welded 
wrought iron pipe, known as ‘standard pipe’; that it all had the same market 
value, the same weight per foot, the same thickness of walls, the same 
internal and external diameter, the same quality of galvanization, the same 
wearing qualities, and the same external appearance.  
 Plaintiff also sought to show the trade meaning of the words ‘standard,’ 
‘lap-welded,’ and ‘wrought iron.’ In other words, plaintiff sought to prove 
that every foot of pipe that went into this work was of the same value and 
quality as that which was called for, and that the only departure from the 
specifications was that by inadvertence some pipe was placed in the building 
which was not manufactured by the same maker as that specified.”), aff'd, 
129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921). 
16.  For examples of these exchanges see Record, supra note 5, at 89–95. 
17. Record, supra note 5, passim.  
18. Ching, supra note 3, at 74 (footnote omitted). 
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Actually, there was a factual basis, albeit not in the record. There had 
been a previous trial. In that trial the judge let the facts in and the jury 
found for Jacob & Youngs.19 The trial judge, however, held that “[i]t 
was error to submit the case to the jury, and for that reason the verdict 
should be set aside, and also for the reason that it was against the 
weight of evidence.”20 There is no indication as to why a second trial 
was necessary.21 Perhaps the existence of that factual record was the 
basis for Kent’s decision to stipulate that a finding for the plaintiff 
would be dispositive: “[D]efendant hereby stipulates and agrees that if 
the said order of the Appellate Division be affirmed, judgment absolute 
shall be rendered against him in favor of the above-named plaintiff.”22 
Cardozo was not being aggressive; he was merely doing what the parties 
had agreed to. 
That only explains why Cardozo could render a final judgment in 
the case. It does not justify that judgment. The decision raised a 
number of issues. Why should the plaintiff’s willfulness matter? Why 
settle for substantial performance? If the law is to find substantial 
performance, what should be subtracted from the contract price—the 
value of completed performance, the cost of completion, or something 
else? Finally, there is the dog that didn’t bark. The contract made the 
final payment conditional on the architect’s certificate. No certificate, 
no payment it would seem. Neither Cardozo nor McLaughlin even 
raised that argument; what happened? 
Before moving on to these questions, I should make four observ-
ations. First, there was an easier way to get to the result. The 
specifications included the following: “Where any particular brand of 
manufactured article is specified, it is to be considered as a standard. 
Contractors desiring to use another shall first make application in 
writing to the Architect, stating the difference in cost, and obtain their 
written approval of the change.”23 Plaintiff’s brief noted: “Under this 
provision of the contract, pipe of Reading Manufacture was to be 
regarded simply as ‘standard’. Plaintiff, having furnished pipe equal in 
all respects thereto complied with this provision of the contract. Its  
19.  Brief for Appellant at 21, Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889 
(N.Y. 1921), reprinted in 3 Records and Briefs of Landmark 
Benjamin Cardozo Opinions (William Manz, ed., 2001). 
20. Id. at 23.  
21. The first trial concluded on June 25, 1918, the second on October 29 of the 
same year. Id. at 21; Record, supra note 5, at 24. I could find no indication 
of what happened in the interim. Nor could I find the record of the first trial. 
22. Record, supra note 5, at 123; but see Ching, supra note 3, at 112 (claiming 
that there was no such stipulation). 
23. Record, supra note 5, at 107. See also Richard Danzig & Geoffrey 
Watson, The Capability Problem in Contract Law: Further 
Readings on Well-Known Cases 111–112 (2004) (referring to clause 22). 
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only failure was in inadvertently omitting to get the approval of the 
architect.”24 If Jacob & Youngs could prove that the non-Reading pipe 
met the standard, then its breach was only the failure to get the 
architect’s written approval. Damages for this failure would be nominal 
since there would have been no basis for the architect to withhold 
approval. 
Second, in discussing the Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
illustration in § 229, which is based on Jacob & Youngs, Scott & Kraus 
make this argument:  
It is, of course, possible that the drafting was careless or made in 
ignorance of the legal implications of making a contractual 
obligation a condition rather than a promise. But such a con-
clusion would require some objective evidence to override the 
strong presumption that commercially sophisticated parties such 
as . . . the contractor, exercise reasonable care in executing their 
agreements and know or should know the legal implications of the 
express contractual language to which they agree.25  
The legal implications depend on both the contract language and the 
law of the relevant jurisdiction. If, in fact, the pre-existing New York 
law imposed constraints on the contractual language, the parties should 
be presumed to have the knowledge of both the contract language and 
the law. 
That leads to the third point. The contract was a standard form 
contract for the entire country.26 If the language was inconsistent with 
New York law, then it had to be interpreted accordingly. That is pretty 
obvious. It matters, particularly in resolving the nonbarking dog 
problem. It turns out that New York gave less weight than most other 
jurisdictions to the architect’s certificate. 
Fourth, I, and (I suspect) most contracts professors, had been under 
the impression that the prominence of Cardozo’s decision was due to 
its innovative nature and that much of this—the emphasis on 
willfulness, the substantial performance, the value of performance—was 
a sharp break from the past. In fact, it was not. As we shall see, the 
notion of substantial performance of building contracts and the role of 
willfulness was over fifty years old.27 New York precedent on the cost  
24. Brief for Plaintiff at 7, Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 890 
(N.Y. 1921), reprinted in 3 Records and Briefs of Landmark 
Benjamin Cardozo Opinions (William H. Manz ed., 2001).; see also 
Andrew L. Kaufman, Cardozo 351 (1998) (recognizing this alternative).  
25. Kraus & Scott, supra note 4, at 1096.  
26. See Record, supra note 5, at 19 (“He sues upon a contract, standard 
printed contract and specifications which form part of the contract.”).  
27.  See infra notes 60–70 and accompanying text (discussing how the substantial 
performance rule created by Nolan v. Whitney became entrenched in New 
York law). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 66·Issue 1·2015 
Rethinking Jacob & Youngs v. Kent 
117 
versus value of completion was skimpier, but it did exist, even though 
it was not cited in plaintiff’s brief. 
The legal background will be described in Part I. I begin with the 
development of the doctrine of substantial performance and the role of 
willfulness. If the contractor’s compensation were conditional on the 
architect providing a certificate of completion, what happens if the 
architect refused to provide the certificate? If a court concludes that 
the work had been substantially performed, how should the contractor’s 
award be modified? In Part II, I revisit Jacob & Youngs to show how 
the result followed from the pre-existing law. That, of course, does not 
mean that it was a sensible outcome. In Part III, I show that the Jacob 
& Youngs result has, in essence, been incorporated into the standard 
form building contracts. 
I. The Pre-Jacob & Youngs v. Kent Law 
A. Substantial Performance and Willfulness 
Suppose that a builder erects a structure that does not perfectly 
comply with the contractual specifications. If the owner rejects it and 
insists that it be removed, the builder would not be paid and, quite 
likely, any progress payments would be returned. If the owner occupies 
the building, courts have generally held that such occupation would not 
be a waiver of any of the conditions in the contract. Jacob & Youngs 
raised the waiver argument, but it did not go anywhere.28 The question 
that arises in such cases is whether the builder should be compensated 
for its less-than-perfect effort and whether there should be any 
allowance for the imperfection. If the builder must fully comply, the 
owner might receive a perfectly acceptable building but use a pretext 
to refuse to pay.29 On the other hand, if the builder can ignore the 
specifications and still get paid the bulk of its fees, its incentives to 
comply with the contractual specifications are weakened. The doctrinal 
response to this is the notion of substantial performance. 
 
28. See Record, supra note 5, at 20–21 (acknowledging “that it was conceded 
at the last trial that taking possession was not waiver”). 
29. The builder cannot reclaim any of the materials once they are incorporated 
into the building.  
 The owner of the soil is always in possession. The builder has a 
right to enter only for the special purpose of performing his 
contract. Each material as it is placed in the work becomes annexed 
to the soil, and thereby the property of the owner. The builder 
would have no right to remove the brick or stone or lumber after 
annexation, even if the employer should unjustifiably refuse to 
allow him to proceed with the work. 
 Smith v. Brady, 17 N.Y. 173, 188 (1858). 
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The common law rule in the early nineteenth century chose the 
former path. In Ellis v. Hamlen30 Sir James Mansfield rejected the 
builder’s claim.31 It appears that the builder did receive a substantial 
amount of money in progress payments and that none was clawed 
back.32 So it appears that the owner did not receive the cost of 
completion; it was just allowed to avoid the final payment. Nonetheless, 
the opinion was quite clear that there would be no room for an 
argument of substantial performance. 
In 1828 in Hayward v. Leonard,33 the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts held that although the builder failed to perform as per 
contract, the builder could nonetheless be compensated in quantum 
meruit.34 The same issue arose in New York in an 1858 decision, Smith 
 
30. (1810) 128 Eng. Rep. 21, 3 Taunt. 52. 
31. The court said the following: 
Here the Plaintiff has properly declared on his special contract, and 
he has shewn and proved that he made such a contract, and has 
received much money on it. He cannot now be permitted to turn 
round and say, I will be paid by a measure-and-value price. The 
Defendant agrees to have a building of such and such dimensions: is 
he to have his ground covered with buildings of no use, which he 
would be glad to see removed, and is he to be forced to pay for them 
besides? It is said he has the benefit of the houses, and therefore the 
Plaintiff is entitled to recover on a quantum valebant. To be sure it 
is hard that he should build houses and not be paid for them; but 
the difficulty is to know where to draw the line; for if the Defendant 
is obliged to pay in a case where there is one deviation from his 
contract, he may equally be obliged to pay for anything, how far 
soever distant from what the contract stipulated for. The Plaintiff 
accordingly was nonsuited; and the case was never again moved. 
Id. at 22, 3 Taunt. at 53. 
32. Id. at 22, 3 Taunt. at 53 (finding that the builder “has received much 
money on [the contract]”).  
33. 24 Mass. (7 Pick.) 181 (1828). 
34. Id. at 185–87. Technically, the court allowed recovery in quantum meruit 
for labor and quantum valebant for materials. In a subsequent decision, 
the court elaborated: 
In this commonwealth, . . . a plaintiff who has substantially performed 
a building contract except in some comparatively slight deviations, or 
in some slight unessential variations, may recover on a count in 
quantum meruit if he can show an attempt to perform it with such an 
“approximation to complete performance that the owner obtained 
substantially what was called for by the contract, although it may not 
be the same in every particular, and although there may be omissions 
and imperfections on account of which there should be a deduction 
from the contract price.” . . . But it is also the settled law of this 
commonwealth that an intentional departure or wilful default in the 
performance of a substantial stipulation of a contract is in itself such 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 66·Issue 1·2015 
Rethinking Jacob & Youngs v. Kent 
119 
v. Brady,35 the opinion quoted at length in McLauglin’s dissent. The 
court rejected the restitution route but did hold out a possibility of 
recovery in certain circumstances for substantial performance. The 
contract in Smith had the same structure as the Kent contract. The 
owner would make progress payments, and payment was conditional on 
the architect granting a certificate.36 The contract price was $4,900, and 
the final payment was to be $2,000.37 The court appeared quite willing 
to decide the case on the builder’s failure to obtain the architect’s 
certificate:  
The parties have seen fit to make the production of such a 
certificate a condition precedent to the payment. The plaintiff is 
as much bound by this part of his contract as any other. It is not 
enough for him to bring his action and say that he has completed 
the work which he undertook to do. He has agreed that the 
architects named should decide whether the work is completed or 
not. He cannot now withdraw the decision of this question from 
them and refer it to the determination of a legal tribunal.38 
The referee held that by occupying the structure the owner had 
waived the certificate condition and that the builder should be paid the 
contract price less an adjustment to account for the deficiencies. On 
appeal the waiver argument was rejected.39 The referee found “that 
there were ‘some omissions and deficiencies in the work and materials 
which the contract required to be done by the plaintiff, the value of 
which, or, in other words, the loss to the defendant thereby,’ amounted 
to $212.57.”40 This position was rejected on appeal:  
 
bad faith as bars recovery, regardless of the presence or absence of an 
intent to gain or obtain some advantage thereby. 
 Smedley v. Walden, 141 N.E. 281, 284 (Mass. 1923). 
35. 17 N.Y. 173 (1858). 
36.  See id. at 174 (“For this work, which was to be completed before May 1, 
1851, the defendant agreed to pay the plaintiff the sum of $4900, of which 
a part was to be paid from time to time, as the work progressed, and the 
balance ‘when all the work should be completed and certified by the 
architects to that effect.’”). 
37. Smith, 17 N.Y. at 174. There was an additional claim for $295 for additional 
work. Id. 
38. Id. at 176. 
39.  See id. (“[W]hether or not the performance of the condition in question 
was waived was a question of fact to be determined by the referee from 
the evidence before him, and no such fact has been found by him.”). 
40. Id. at 179–80. 
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The particulars in which the referee found the contracts not 
performed are not stated in his report, but they could not have 
been so unimportant that the law will refuse to notice them, 
because, in the same report the value of those particulars is 
ascertained to be over $200. Nor is it found that the plaintiff 
intended to perform his contract. For aught that appears, the 
omissions and defects were intentional and willful, and, in the 
absence of all explanation, the presumption is that they were so.41 
This seems to put the burden of proof regarding willfulness on the 
builder. It appears that the valuation of the deficiencies would have 
been based on the difference in market value, not on the cost of 
completion. Some, perhaps all, of the deficiencies were structural, unlike 
those in Kent. The joists were supposed to be twelve inches apart, but 
they were sixteen inches apart. The difference between the beams was 
supposed to be sixteen inches, but it was twenty-four inches. The court 
rejected the builder’s argument that the building was good enough.42 
After noting that the “good enough” standard had been adopted in 
some other states, the court stated:  
Indeed, in this state the sanctity of contracts in this respect at 
least, has been steadily maintained, and no encouragement has 
ever been given to that loose and dangerous doctrine which allows 
a person to violate his most solemn engagements and then to draw 
 
41. Id. at 180. 
42. Rejecting the builder’s argument, the court said the following: 
To meet the defence so far as it depended on these particular 
departures from the contract, the plaintiff was allowed to call other 
mechanics and ask them as follows: “Are the houses without these 
deficient joists and beams, sufficiently strong for the character of the 
buildings?” The evidence was objected to on the part of the 
defendant, but the objection was overruled, the plaintiff’s counsel 
stating that the object of the inquiry was to ascertain what damages, 
if any, should be allowed by reason of this deficiency in the work. 
This ruling of the referee was duly excepted to; and the evidence 
being given tended to show that the houses were sufficiently strong, 
that the joists and beams were placed at distances customary in that 
neighborhood, and that the defendant really was not injured at all 
by this violation of the contract. The question now to be determined 
is whether this evidence was proper; and this will, I think, involve 
the inquiry whether the plaintiff, having failed in substantially 
performing the contract, was entitled to recover for his work and 
materials, making to the defendant an allowance for the breaches, to 
be adjusted according to some principle of equity.  
Id. at 181. 
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the injured party into a controversy concerning the amount and 
value of the benefits received.43  
The court then made the “Doric column” argument quoted by 
McLaughlin.44 Still, the court concluded that slight inadvertent devia-
tions would be tolerated.45 
Thus, there was at least some possibility that a contractor could 
recover for substantial performance without relying on restitution. The 
decision does not make clear whether a finding of substantial 
performance would trump the failure of an architect to provide a 
certificate. Nor does it make clear whether the owner could claw back 
any of the previous payments. Hunter asserts that there was no claw 
back although the decision says nothing about this.46 
The substantial performance rule soon became the law in New 
York. In Woodward v. Fuller,47 an 1880 decision cited by both Cardozo 
and McLaughlin, the referee found that the “failure was caused by his 
inadvertence and that of his workmen, and by the want of skill and 
 
43. Id. at 186. 
44. Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 893 (N.Y. 1921) (McLaughlin, 
J., dissenting). 
45. The court said the following:  
To conclude, there is, in a just view of the question, no hardship in 
requiring builders, like all other men, to perform their contracts in 
order to entitle themselves to payment, where the employer has agreed 
to pay only on that condition. It is true that such contracts embrace 
a variety of particulars, and that slight omissions and inadvertences 
may sometimes very innocently occur. These should be indulgently 
regarded, and they will be so regarded by courts and juries. But there 
can be no injustice in imputing to the contractor a knowledge of what 
his contract requires, nor in holding him to a substantial performance. 
Id. at 190. 
46.    Hunter asserted: 
 The suit was for the final payment. The owner had made installment 
payments as the construction went along, and he was not seeking to 
have them returned. He simply did not want to make the final 
payment. Thus, the contractor received at least some of the payment 
due under the agreement for a performance that was nonconforming, 
and he saved the expense of buying and installing a large number of 
joists. The owner received cottages that were nonconforming, but at 
a price lower than the contract. Whether the court would have 
followed through on its rule of strict performance and have required 
the contractor to refund the installment payments had the owner 
sought that relief is questionable. 
 Howard O. Hunter, Modern Law of Contracts § 11:4 (2015 ed.). 
47. 80 N.Y. 312 (1880). 
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judgment of some of the latter.”48 The defects were “that the roof and 
chimneys were not well supported; that folding doors were not well 
hung, and the casings thereto well fastened; that the tar-paper and 
clapboards, in some few instances, were not well put on, and one door 
and casings not fitted so that the door would shut.”49 The court noted: 
It is now the rule, that where a builder has in good faith intended 
to comply with the contract, and has substantially complied with 
it, although there may be slight defects caused by inadvertence 
or unintentional omissions, he may recover the contract price, less 
the damage on account of such defects.50  
All these deviations, the court held, could be remedied. It concluded 
that the builder had substantially performed and that there should be 
some allowance deducted from the contract price to account for the 
deviations.51 
By the time Jacob & Youngs was being decided, the gap created 
by Smith had widened considerably. Writing in 1910, Joseph Beale 
noted: “Where a contractor, performing his contract in good faith, 
substantially complies with his obligation, but makes some compara-
tively slight deviations, he may recover compensation for the work 
done.”52 The majority position in the United States was summarized in 
an American Law Report (A.L.R.) article appearing in 1920, the year 
before Jacob & Youngs was decided: 
It is generally conceded that the common-law rule requiring a 
strict or literal performance of a contract has been greatly relaxed 
in actions on building contracts, so that a builder need only 
substantially perform his agreement in good faith in order to 
support a recovery. In such case the builder is entitled to recover 
the contract price, less a deduction for the damage caused by the 
omissions or defects. By a “wilful” or an “intentional” departure, 
as the phrase is used in this note, is meant a departure in bad 
faith. 
Majority rule 
By the weight of authority a building contractor who wishes to 
take advantage of the doctrine of substantial performance must  
48. Id. at 314. 
49. Id. at 316. 
50. Id. at 315–16. 
51. See id. at 317 (“[A]n allowance out of the contract price will make to the 
defendant full indemnity.”).  
52. Joseph H. Beale, The Measure of Recovery Upon Implied and Quasi-
Contracts, 19 Yale L.J. 609, 609 (1910). 
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not be guilty of a wilful or an intentional departure from the 
terms of his contract. If he wilfully or intentionally departs from 
the terms of the contract, either in materials or work, he is barred 
from recovering anything.53 
Jacob & Youngs was prepared to prove that the pipe was identical 
in every respect, including price. What if it had shopped and found a 
batch of Cohoes pipe at a bargain price? Would that have been enough 
to be labeled willful?54 I doubt it. Corbin, writing shortly before the 
case was decided, suggested that it would not.55 
While the parties in Woodward did phase performance, the decision 
was silent on whether payment was contingent on an architect’s 
certificate. What if the payment were conditioned on the architect 
providing a certificate and the architect refused? To that question we 
next turn. 
 
53. Wilful or Intentional Variation by Contractor from Terms of Contract in 
Regard to Material or Work as Affecting Measure of Damages, 6 A.L.R. 
137 (1920). 
54. The Restatement (Third) of Restitution uses an illustration based on Jacob & 
Youngs v. Kent in which the contractor substitutes an equivalent product but 
at a cost saving of $15,000. It claims that the savings should go to the owner, 
not the contractor: “The case is not within the rule of § 39 (because Builder’s 
default is unintentional), but principles of unjust enrichment reinforce the 
conclusion that saved expenditure makes an appropriate measure of contract 
damages in such a case.” Restatement (Third) of Restitution and 
Unjust Enrichment § 39 (Am. Law. Inst. 2011). I find it hard to believe 
that a court would reach that conclusion. What purpose could be served by 
imposing a one hundred percent tax on the contractor’s efforts to control costs? 
55.   Corbin observed:  
 What constitutes substantial performance must be determined with 
reference to the particular facts in each case. The question is always 
one of degree and its solution must be doubtful in many cases. If the 
defendant has himself regarded the deviation as not going to the 
essence, this will generally be decisive for the court. The ratio of 
damage done to benefits received will be considered. The degree of 
moral delinquency on the plaintiff’s part will go far to resolve doubts: 
Has the plaintiff wilfully regarded his contract as a “scrap of paper”? 
Was his nonperformance intentional but caused by difficulties and 
hardships? Was his breach an unconscious one? Was he grossly 
negligent or reasonably prudent? It is frequently said any wilful breach 
on the plaintiff’s part will prevent any recovery by him against the 
defendant. This is altogether too strong a statement. Even while laying 
down such a principle, the court is nevertheless considering the degree 
of nonperformance and the degree of moral delinquency.  
 Arthur L. Corbin, Conditions in the Law of Contract, 28 Yale L.J. 739, 
761 (1919). 
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B. The Lack of an Architect’s Certificate 
In Smith the court recognized that “[t]o avoid a protracted and 
expensive litigation, such as this has proved to be, the parties agreed 
that, in respect to all disputes between them in relation to the work, 
the architects should be the ultimate arbiters.”56 The final payment was 
to be paid “when all the work should be completed and certified by the 
architects to that effect.”57 The builder had not procured the certificate, 
but he stated that was “in consequence of the unreasonableness and 
frivolous objections of the said architects, or one of them, in refusing to 
give any certificate.”58 While the referee apparently found this enough 
to allow him to reject the certificate condition, the court did not. Even 
so, the court did allow that there could be some circumstances that 
would allow it to ignore the certificate condition: “Had it been shown 
by the plaintiff that he had made application to the architects for the 
requisite certificate, and that they had obstinately and unreasonably 
refused to certify, it might have been proper, perhaps, for the plaintiff 
to establish his right to recover by other evidence.”59 The rule, however, 
was clear. Barring some extreme circumstances, the certificate condition 
was binding. 
Two years after Woodward, Nolan v. Whitney changed the rule.60 
In effect, the court held that if the finder of fact found that there had 
been substantial performance, the court could infer that the denial of 
the certificate was unreasonable: 
The performance of a building contract need not in all cases be 
literal and exact to enable the contractor to recover the consider-
ation due upon performance; it is sufficient, if acting in good faith 
and intending and attempting to perform, he does so substant-
ially. He may then recover, notwithstanding slight or trivial de-
fects for which compensation can be made by an allowance to the 
other party. 
Where the contractor has so substantially performed although by 
the contract he is bound to procure an architect’s certificate of 
performance to his satisfaction; he may recover without procuring 
such certificate, upon showing a refusal of the architect to give it; 
the refusal in such case is unreasonable.61 
 
56. Smith v. Brady, 17 N.Y. 173, 177 (1858). 
57. Id. at 174. 
58. Id. at 175. 
59. Id. at 176.  
60. 88 N.Y. 648 (1882). 
61. Id. at 648–49. 
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The opinion did not give any indication of why it had concluded 
that the failure to give the certificate was unreasonable. So I turned to 
an examination of the Record to see if there was an explanation. Unlike 
in Jacob & Youngs, the deficiencies were observable. The owner 
complained:  
[T]he work was to be first-class; but the front walls were bad, the 
plastering was bad, and the walls were not laid in the kind of 
mortar (cement mortar) required by the contract. These defects 
cover the whole work. The defects complained of could not be 
remedied without taking the walls down and all the plastering 
off.62  
The architect testified and was examined by the referee: 
Q. I should like to ask if this plastering was such a job as that 
you would have given or withheld your certificate if he applied 
for it? 
A. I shouldn’t have given my certificate without Dr. Whitney’s 
consent, on account of their [sic] being defects to the eye as well 
as others. 
Q. What was your reason for giving that answer that you 
withheld your certificate until you got Dr. Whitney’s consent? 
A. Because the work was not finished according to the 
contract . . . I couldn’t conscientiously have given a certificate 
[the remainder of the answer of the witness is stricken out].63 
A. Very little variation [of a contract] would prevent me from 
giving a certificate. I intend in my business to allow no 
variation—nothing at all. I find no fault with anything except the 
plastering.64 I shouldn’t have hesitated to give a certificate for 
anything but the plastering, and for all of that, but the defects I 
have mentioned—everything else was good.65 
The referee then awarded the builder his final payment of $2,700 
less $200 (there were four prior payments):66 
I do find and decide 
 
62. Brief for Appellant at 25, Nolan v. Whitney, 88 N.Y. 648 (1882).  
63. Id. at 15. 
64. Points for Respondent at 5, Nolan v. Whitney, 88 N.Y. 648 (1882). 
65. Record at 115, Nolan v. Whitney, 88 N.Y. 648 (1882) (on file with the 
Case Western Reserve Law Review). 
66. Points for Respondent, supra note 65, at 2, 11. 
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* * * 
Third—That the plaintiff in good faith intended to comply with 
and has substantially complied with and performed the require-
ments of said contract. 
Fourth—I find that there were trivial defects in the plastering, 
for which a deduction of two hundred dollars should be made 
from the said last installment. 
* * * 
Sixth—That no certificate signed by said architect was ever 
obtained by plaintiff for the said last installment, for the reason 
that said architect unreasonably and improperly refused to sign 
the same.67 
The trial court affirmed the referee’s decision: 
The work was entirely, and in good faith, completed. From 
various causes the last coat of plastering was defective in some 
particulars. There is no evidence to show that these defects were 
intentional or designed. Every effort was made to remedy them. 
It was impossible to do so in some trivial particulars and for this 
the Referee allowed a deduction of $200. The allowance of this 
sum is not evidence that the contract was not substantially 
performed.68 
The $200 adjustment should be kept in mind when we consider the 
remedy issue in the next Part. The Nolan rule became firmly entrenched 
in New York. The law was described in a brief (one page!) note in the 
Harvard Law Review twenty years after the decision: 
American courts have in general shown greater leniency than the 
English in regard to the performance of express conditions pre-
cedent. In no class of cases is this fact better brought out than in 
suits on building contracts in which payment is to be made only 
when the architect’s certificate is obtained. In England the builder 
must produce the certificate; he can only excuse himself by 
proving collusion between the architect and the defendant. In 
most of our states fraud or gross mistake in withholding the order 
will entitle the plaintiff to sue on the contract without it. But in 
New York, if the plaintiff can persuade the jury that he has 
 
67. Record at 130, Nolan v. Whitney, 88 N.Y. 648 (1882) (on file with Case 
Western Reserve Law Review). 
68. Id. At 146. 
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substantially performed the contract he can recover in spite of the 
architect’s disapproval.69 
This result did not meet with the approval of the author: 
But it is conceived that the true rule is that an honest refusal of 
the architect to give the certificate, no matter how mistaken he 
may be, debars the builder from suing on the contract. This rule, 
while mitigating the harshness of the English doctrine, is yet 
within the fair meaning of the contract. To make it more lenient 
is virtually to substitute a jury for the architect. To make it more 
strict is to acknowledge that the latter need not give an honest 
judgment. Each of these results is equally undesirable, and the 
decision of the principal case, tending as it does to enlarge the 
scope of the New York doctrine, is to be regretted.70 
A possible justification of the New York rule was forwarded one 
year before Cardozo’s Jacob & Youngs decision in Wilson v. Curran.71  
The departure of the authorities from the strict application of the 
rule that, as the architect is the arbitrator, his determination 
 
69. Note, Contracts Requiring the Architect’s Approval as a Prerequisite to 
Payment, 15 Harv. L. Rev. 481 (1902) (citations omitted). He continued: 
A recent decision in a circuit court of Ohio adopts the New York 
view. The plaintiff sued on a building contract containing the usual 
condition of payment upon presentation of the architect’s certificate. 
He did not produce the certificate, and could not prove fraud. The 
jury found specially that the architect’s reason for refusing the 
certificate was dissatisfaction with the work. The court, on appeal, 
sustained a general verdict in favor of the plaintiff on the ground 
that it was not found that the architect’s refusal was reasonable.  
 Id. 
70. Id. at 482 (citation omitted). Another Harvard Law Review note, ten years 
earlier, also recognized the various treatments of the certificate condition: 
[P]revention by the defendant of performance of the condition will 
excuse non-performance. A descending scale of prevention of 
performance of this particular condition might be thus written: (1) 
prevention directly by the defendant, or indirectly by his collusion with 
the architect; (2) prevention by fraud on the part of the architect; and 
(3) prevention by the unwillingness or unreasonableness of the 
architect. But of these three, only (1) has the quality of prevention laid 
in the above rule; namely, prevention by the defendant. Authority and 
principle agree that (1) excuses non-performance; but on (2) and (3) 
they part company, (2) being the more conservative rule adopted in 
this country, and (3) the more general rule. 
 Note, Builders’ Contracts With Architects’ Certificate; The True Ground 
Of Their Decision, 6 Harv. L. Rev. 201, 202 (1893) (citation omitted). 
71. 180 N.Y.S. 337 (1920).  
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cannot be impeached except for fraud, misconduct, or palpable 
error on the face of the certificate is due, I think, in part at least, 
to the fact that in these contracts the architect is employed and 
paid by the owner. . . . It is a rule growing out of the practical 
difficulty of the architect’s serving two masters, and the milder 
word ‘unreasonable’ is under the circumstances preferred by the 
courts to the words ‘constructive fraud.’72 
C. Cost Versus Value of Completion 
In Smith v. Brady the architect was asked what it would cost to 
make the building conform to the contract specifications and on the 
difference in value between the structures as built and what the value 
would have been had the building conformed to the contract.73 The 
referee did not permit the witness to opine on either matter; the court 
ruled that this was error.74 The fact that the witness was to opine on 
both the cost and value of completion suggests that there was no 
consensus on the appropriate measure of damages. In Nolan, as noted 
above, the referee reduced the contractor’s recovery by $200 (about 
eight percent of the final payment and two percent of the overall 
contract price).75 The Record gave no explanation for this figure, but it 
is reasonable to infer that the adjustment was based on the loss of value 
of the building due to the deviation, since the cost of repair would have 
entailed tearing down the walls. 
When Jacob & Youngs was decided, the value versus cost of 
completion question was not a matter of either/or. A 1923 A.L.R. 
annotation distinguished between two situations, one calling for value 
and the other for cost: “Where the defects are remediable without 
taking down and reconstructing any substantial portion of the building, 
the amount of deduction from the contract price to which the owner is 
entitled is the expense of making the work conform to contract require-
ments.”76 If, however, the defect were not remediable, the annotation 
opted for the difference in value: 
Where it is necessary, in order to make the building comply with 
the contract, and to prevent damage to parts thereof, which 
would necessitate expensive repairs, that the structure, in whole 
or in part, be changed, the measure of the owner’s damage is the 
difference between the value of the building as actually con-
structed and the value it would have had, had it been constructed 
 
72. Id. at 339 (citation omitted). 
73.  Smith v. Brady, 17 N.Y. 173, 177–178 (1858). 
74. Id. 
75. Points for Respondent, supra note 65, at 2, 11. 
76. Annotation, Measure of Recovery by Building Contractor Where Contract 
is Substantially but not Exactly Performed, 23 A.L.R. 1435 (1923).  
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in accordance with the contract; since to measure the owner’s 
damage by the sum necessary to make the building conform to 
the contract would, in many instances, inflict an injustice on the 
contractor, as it would amount to almost as much as the original 
contract price. 
An intentional departure from, or wilful default in the perform-
ance of, a substantial stipulation, is, in itself, such bad faith as 
will bar recovery, regardless of the presence or absence of an 
intent to obtain some advantage thereby.77 
II. Back to Jacob & Youngs v. Kent 
As I noted, neither Cardozo nor McLaughlin mentioned the 
certificate condition. Professors Schwartz and Scott state that “the 
builder . . . did not attempt to impeach the architect’s decision. Rather, 
the builder asked a court to hold that perfect compliance was not a 
condition to receiving the entire last payment; the court agreed.”78 
Given the New York rule, it would not have been necessary to impeach 
the decision. Nevertheless, contrary to the assertion of Schwartz and 
Scott, the plaintiff did attempt to argue that the architect had been 
unreasonable. In the complaint, Plaintiff asserted:  
That after the completion by the plaintiff of the work required by 
said contract, the plaintiff duly demanded of the architect named 
therein that he issue to the plaintiff his certificate of the 
completion of the said building and of the amount due to the 
plaintiff under the said contract and for said extra work and 
materials, but that the said architect has unreasonably and 
unjustly failed and refused so to do.79 
When the plaintiff attempted to introduce evidence about why the 
certificate was not given, he was rebuffed: 
Q. Mr. Youngs, did you subsequent to the receipt of the letters 
of March 19th, 1915, and November 23rd 1915, . . . and 
subsequent to the receipt of the letter of January 6th, 1916, have 
any conversation with Mr. William Wells Bosworth, the architect, 
under this contract, with reference to granting you a certificate 
for your work; a final certificate? 
 
77. Annotation, Measure of Recovery by Building Contractor Where Contract 
is Substantially but not Exactly Performed, 65 A.L.R. 1297 (1930) 
(supplementing 23 A.L.R. 1435).  
78. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of 
Contract Law, 113 Yale L.J. 541, 616 (2003). 
79. Record, supra note 5, at 6. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 66·Issue 1·2015 
Rethinking Jacob & Youngs v. Kent 
130 
A. I did. 
Mr. Hardon: One moment. It was alleged the certificate was 
refused. That is the issue, and it appears now that the certificate 
was refused because of the failure to perform the contract in 
respect to the plumbing. The witness has so testified. Under those 
circumstances any conversation between Bosworth and the 
witness is not binding upon us. 
The Court: I will let him say yes or no to that. 
The Witness: I did, yes. 
Q. What did Mr. Bosworth say to you when you made that 
request? 
Mr. Hardon: Same objection. Objection sustained.80 
Plaintiff’s Brief commented on this exchange:  
Mr. Youngs, who had a conversation with the architect relative 
to the granting of a certificate to the plaintiff, was not permitted 
to state what the architect said to him concerning the refusal to 
grant this certificate. It might well be that the architect refused 
to issue the certificate simply because the owner requested him 
not to.81 
Not only did Kent’s counsel attempt to keep out testimony 
regarding the architect’s reasons, he appears to argue that the 
architect’s opinions are not relevant. That becomes clearer when he 
raises an objection during the examination of the architect’s assistant:  
Mr. Hardon: One moment; that is not an issue in this case and 
we are not bound by the witness’s opinion. He is not one of our 
employes. He is the employe of Mr. Bosworth: that is all. Mr. 
Bosworth has no power under this contract to waive any defects, 
much less has the witness any such power, so nothing he could 
do could bind us. I object to it as incompetent, irrelevant and 
immaterial.82  
If the architect’s certificate were a condition of payment, the condition 
would be binding on the owner as well; the architect would surely have 
the power to waive any defects if he viewed them as insignificant.  
80. Id. at 38–39. 
81. Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 24, at 6–7 (citation omitted). It is odd that 
the counsel used “might well be.” If that was what had been said, a less 
ambiguous phrasing would have been appropriate. 
82. Record, supra note 5, at 66–67. 
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Kent’s counsel recognized that it was unnecessary to prove the 
architect’s unreasonableness directly: “The absence of a certificate is a 
complete defence to this action, unless the plaintiff made out a case of 
substantial performance. Thus the sole issue on the trial was substantial 
performance of the plumbing specifications.”83 The certificate condition, 
therefore, dropped out of the case. Again, in his brief Kent noted the 
limited issues on appeal and this did not include the applicability of the 
certificate condition:  
The judgment of the trial Court was reversed ‘upon questions of 
law.’ The only questions of law in the case are: (a) Whether on 
the proofs the plaintiff made out a case of substantial perform-
ance; (b) Whether material error was committed by the trial-
Court in excluding evidence tending to show that the pipe 
substituted by the builder for Reading pipe was as good and 
costly as Reading pipe.84 
So the certificate condition was off the table. Plaintiff’s argument 
that it had substantially performed emphasized that it could only make 
that claim if its mistake had been inadvertent and not willful.  
The cases of Smith vs. Brady (17 N. Y. 173), Schultze vs. 
Goodstein (180 N. Y. 248), and Spence vs. Ham (163 N. Y. 220), 
all have to do with wilful and intentional departures from the 
contract. Of course, the plaintiff is making no claim here that if 
it knowingly deviated from the specifications it is entitled to 
recover.85  
The Appellate decision emphasized the lack of willfulness: 
If this had been done deliberately, plaintiff could not have claimed 
complete or substantial performance, for it had no right to 
willfully disregard the provisions of the contract or specifications. 
But where by inadvertence or mistake a minor deviation has been 
made, which involves no damage to the defendant, and defendant 
takes possession of and continues to use the building, without 
seeking to disturb in any respect the work done by the contractor, 
the contractor is entitled to prove that he had substantially 
performed, that the defendant suffered no damage through such 
innocent mistake, and that what the owner received is what he 
had the right to expect to get under his contract.86 
 
83. Brief for Appellant, supra note 20, at 3.  
84. Id.  
85. Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 81 at 17. 
86. Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 175 N.Y.S. 281, 282 (N.Y. App. Div. 1919). 
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A strong case can be made that Jacob & Youngs’ behavior was not 
willful given the law at the time. McLaughlin thought otherwise, as did 
the trial judge in the first trial: “The substitution of other pipe for 
‘Reading’ was not a deviation from the specification. It was a departure 
and not through inadvertence or mistake, but through inexcusable 
negligence.”87 The jury in the first trial, on the other hand, found that 
it was not willful, as did the Appellate court and Cardozo. There seems 
to be a lot of “proof by adjective.” Professor Scott argues that the 
breach was willful, using Judge McLaughlin’s characterization as his 
basis.88 There was, he argued, an untaken precaution, namely, the 
negligent failure to inspect the pipe when it was delivered: “The 
extraordinary costs of completion in Jacob & Youngs resulted from the 
contractor’s failure to inspect the pipe to ensure that it complied with 
the contract specifications.”89 
However, if we accept the majority’s version that there was no 
difference between the different brands of pipe, then the indifference to 
brand name of Jacob & Youngs’ foreman, the plumbing subcontractor’s 
foreman, and the architect’s representative (all of whom did not 
recognize the non-Reading pipe) is not surprising. The criterion, recall, 
was that the contractor had acted in bad faith. It is hard to see how 
the use of the nonconforming pipe could be characterized as bad faith, 
given precedents like Woodward v. Fuller90 and Nolan v. Whitney91 in 
which the defects were observable and the court found that the defects 
reduced the value of the structure.92 
I have long been puzzled by the role of cost of completion in this 
decision. As Cardozo noted: “It is true that in most cases the cost of 
replacement is the measure. The owner is entitled to the money which 
will permit him to complete, unless the cost of completion is grossly 
and unfairly out of proportion to the good to be attained.”93 The case 
is often cited as an illustration of the divergence between the cost and 
value of completion. Yet the cost of completion did not seem to be an 
issue. It did not appear that Kent was suing for the cost of completion; 
 
87. Brief for Appellant, supra note 20, at 22.  
88.  Scott, supra note 4, at 1385. He stated: “Virtually all the ensuing commentary 
has accepted Cardozo’s characterization of the contractor’s behavior in Jacob 
& Youngs as accidental and has justified the nonwillful characterization of 
the breach. Unfortunately, however, that characterization appears to be 
false.” Id. at 1385–1386. 
89. Id. at 1386. 
90.  80 N.Y. 312 (1880). 
91.  88 N.Y. 648 (1882). 
92. Both cases were discussed supra at notes 47–51 and 60–68. 
93. Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 891 (N.Y. 1921) (citation 
omitted). 
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he only was defending himself from having to make the final payment. 
I could not understand why he did not ask for full cost of completion 
damages, in effect clawing back some of the previous progress 
payments. 
The record provides two answers. First, he did counterclaim for 
$10,000.94 However, the counterclaim was subsequently withdrawn.95 
Second, the contract dealt with the matter. If the contractor failed to 
perform, the contractor would not be entitled to “further payment[s].”96 
If the owner hired someone to continue the work, the contractor would 
be liable for those additional expenses; but since Kent did not attempt 
to replace the nonconforming pipes, the contract limited the con-
tractor’s exposure to the final payment of 5% of the contract price.97 
The contract did not, therefore, restrict the remedy options to cost 
versus value. The standard contract at the time capped the contractor’s 
liability. He would not be able to collect the final payment, but none of 
the previous payments would be clawed back. If the owner found the 
defect worth remedying, the cost of that remedy would be charged to 
the contractor and set off against the final payment. If the owner did 
not find the defect of sufficient importance to warrant remediation, 
compensation would either be forfeiture of the last payment or the lost 
value—although it is not clear whether that would be market value or 
idiosyncratic value of the particular plaintiff. 
McLaughlin noted that the plaintiff had failed to show what it 
would cost to remove the pipe.98 While that would have been relevant 
if replacing the pipe were a realistic possibility, it was irrelevant in this 
case. The cost of remedying the “error” almost certainly exceeded the 
final payment. The counterclaim of $10,000 gives some indication of the 
cost. In his Brief, Kent acknowledged that repair would not be a 
 
94. Record, supra note 5, at 14. 
95. Id. at 18. 
96. Id. at 100.  
97. Id. at 100–101. The relevant language was in Article V of the contract. 
Id. Article IX of the contract set the final payment at 15%; this was also 
the case in Article IX of the contract between the contractor and the 
plumbing subcontractor. Id at 102, 114. There is no explanation of why 
the 15% hold-back had been transformed into a 5% hold-back. The 
contractor-subcontractor contract had nearly identical language. Id. at 
114. If, hypothetically, the deviation could have been repaired for $2,000 
and Kent, in fact, had it done, then the cost could have been shifted to 
the subcontractor; while the $2,000 would have been less than 3% of the 
contractor’s fee, it would have been about one-third of the sub’s fee.  
98. Jacob & Youngs, 129 N.E. at 892 (McLaughlin, J., dissenting). 
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“practical thing” since the cost would have substantially exceeded the 
remaining balance.99 
The decision gave the contractor his final payment with a possible 
adjustment to reflect the difference in value. In a per curium opinion 
the court held that the appropriate adjustment was zero.100 So, after 
almost seven years, Jacob & Youngs was finally paid.101 Cardozo’s 
rationale was phrased in rather flowery language that somewhat 
obscured the reasoning: “Intention not otherwise revealed may be 
presumed to hold in contemplation the reasonable and probable. If 
something else is in view, it must not be left to implication. There will 
be no assumption of a purpose to visit venial faults with oppressive 
retribution.”102 He continued:  
This is not to say that the parties are not free by apt and certain 
words to effectuate a purpose that performance of every term 
shall be a condition of recovery. That question is not here. This 
is merely to say that the law will be slow to impute the purpose, 
in the silence of the parties, where the significance of the default 
is grievously out of proportion to the oppression of the 
forfeiture.103  
But, as other commentators have noted, the contract did include those 
“certain words.”104 
I think that this can be translated into more mundane language. 
The court recognized that the owner has an incentive to latch onto any 
defect or deviation, no matter how trivial, to avoid payment. The court 
 
99. Brief for Appellant, supra note 20, at 11. (“In the case at Bar there was 
a total failure to offer any such proof, and the reason is not far to seek. 
With the progress of the European War all plumbing costs, both wages 
and supplies, were mounting to unprecedented heights. The same was true 
of all other costs which would have been incurred in restoring walls, floors, 
ceilings and tiling. That is why, in the plaintiff’s words . . . it was not a 
‘practical thing’ for it to complete performance. The cost would have far 
exceeded the trifling balance remaining unpaid on the contract.”).  
100.  Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, 130 N.E. 933, 230 N.Y. 656 (1921) (“The law . 
. . restricts the remedy to damages.”). 
101.  Jacob & Youngs completed the work in June, 1914. Jacob & Youngs, 129 
N.E. at 890.  
102. Id. at 891. 
103. Id.  
104. See Ching, supra note 3, at 70–71 (“The contract explicitly stated that if 
Jacob & Youngs failed to perform, it could lose its right to further 
payment.”); Peter A. Alces, On Discovering Doctrine: “Justice” in 
Contract Agreement, 83 Wash. U. L.Q. 471, 488 (2005) (referring to 
dictum in Cardozo’s opinion that allows parties to indicate “by apt and 
certain words” that “every term shall be a condition of recovery”). 
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will reject the owner’s position if it believes that the deviation claim is 
opportunistic or strategic. There are tradeoffs. If the courts were to 
routinely find substantial performance, owners would find it more 
difficult to satisfy their idiosyncratic preferences—the Doric columns of 
Smith v. Brady and McLaughlin’s dissent.105 But what if the courts 
erred in the other direction? Contractors might have to incur greater 
costs to make it less likely that an insignificant deviation would result 
in a substantial loss. In this particular case, the extra costs (monitoring 
the pipes identity as they arrived) would have been trivial, as Schwartz 
and Scott noted.106 But Kent could have picked other nits and the 
contractor would have had to be concerned with other possible claims 
of deviations.107 Cardozo did not say so, in so many words, but I think 
it is pretty clear that Cardozo believed Kent’s claim to be purely 
strategic and that if Kent had had to testify he would not have been 
able to produce a reason for why Reading Pipe was important. 
III. The Lessons of Jacob & Youngs v. Kent 
A. Cost Versus Value of Completion 
Courts have generally followed Jacob & Youngs v. Kent in dealing 
with the cost versus value of completion.108 Schwartz and Scott argue 
that this is a mistake. They argue that the efficient default rule would 
 
105. Kent made the argument forcefully in his brief: 
 The opinion of the Appellate Division is thus far from convincing. 
If it is law, it is new law. If it is law, Smith v. Brady, Spence v. 
Ham, Schultze v. Goodstein, and the recent case Steel S & C. Co. 
v. Stock cease to be law. If it is law, provisions in a building 
contract against alterations in the work or specifications without 
consent, for the removal or replacement of condemned material, 
and for full performance and completion of the contract according 
to its terms, have lost all force and effect. If it is law, builders 
become an irresponsible class, and owners contracting for what they 
want can be compelled to pay for what they do not want.  
Brief for Appellant, supra note 20 at 20. 
106.  Schwartz & Scott, Market Damages, supra note 4, at 1615. 
107. There was some evidence that Kent was dissatisfied with the job and was 
searching for a reason to not make the final payment. See Danzig & 
Watson, supra note 23, at 113 (indicating that Kent was dissatisfied). 
108. See Josh M. Leavitt and Daniel G. Rosenberg, Toward A Unified Theory of 
Damages in Construction Cases: Part I—Navigating Through the Diminution 
of Value vs. Cost of Repair Debate in Defect Cases and Allocating Burdens of 
Proof, The Am. C. of Construction Law. J., 2 No. 1 (2014) (stating courts favor 
the costs of repairs over cost of completion). See also John P. Ludington, 
Modern Status of Rule as to Whether Cost of Correction or Difference in 
Value of Structures is Proper Measure of Damages for Breach of Construction 
Contract, 41 A.L.R. 4th 131 (2015) (originally published in 1985). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 66·Issue 1·2015 
Rethinking Jacob & Youngs v. Kent 
136 
be to award the cost of completion even in cases in which it greatly 
exceeds the value of performance. Their concern, like that of Kent’s 
counsel, above, is that a lesser remedy would not give the contractor 
adequate incentives: “But a prepaid seller’s incentive to invest effi-
ciently in cost reduction is materially reduced if her damage exposure 
for failing to invest is capped by the market delta. Cost-of-completion 
damages in these cases thus function as an efficient deterrent against 
this moral hazard.”109 
Schwartz and Scott argue that the market value (or market delta, 
in their terminology) test is a free-floating standard, too vague to give 
the builders appropriate incentives: 
The market delta rule lacks predictability because it is a vague 
standard that is not grounded in particular parties’ circum-
stances. In the economic waste case, a buyer is restricted to 
diminished value when cost-of-completion damages would greatly 
exceed the market delta. The extensive case law following Jacob 
& Youngs, Inc. v. Kent further qualifies the economic waste 
doctrine by requiring that a seller’s default be in “good faith.” If 
her breach is willful or in bad faith, the buyer presumably can 
recover cost-of-completion damages. The instructions to the 
parties and courts that cost-of-completion damages cannot be 
“too high” or that parties must behave in good faith and not 
“willfully” are acontextual and vague: They are not given content 
either by contract terms or by legal rules that reflect the specific 
contexts in which parties function. Free-floating standards such 
as these give parties and courts little guidance. As a result, these 
standards fail to motivate sellers to take efficient precautions 
against ex post cost increases, and they encourage strategic 
breaches whose object is to extort more favorable terms than a 
party could obtain in the initial contract.110 
Indeed, they argue that “there is substantial evidence that parties 
prefer cost-of-completion damages . . . in the construction cases 
exemplified by Jacob & Youngs Inc. v. Kent.”111 As evidence they cite 
the standard construction contract of the American Institute of 
Architects. (AIA):  
The Contractor shall promptly correct Work . . . failing to 
conform to the requirements of the Contract Documents, whether 
discovered before or after Substantial Completion and whether or 
not fabricated, installed or completed. Costs of correcting such 
rejected Work, including additional testing and inspections and  
109. Schwartz & Scott, Market Damages, supra note 4, at 1619. 
110. Id. at 1662 (footnotes omitted). 
111. Id. at 1630. 
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compensation for the Architect’s services . . . shall be at the 
Contractor’s expense.112 
The evidence, however, does not support their claim. Recall that in 
Kent’s contract the liability was capped at the final payment. The 
modern AIA form they cite spreads the remedy rule over three clauses: 
2.4.1, 12.2.1.1, and 12.3.1.113 The first two require that the contractor 
bear the costs of repair incurred either by itself or by a replacement 
chosen by the owner. The third deals with the case in which the defect 
is not corrected. If the owner accepts the work, “instead of requiring its 
removal or correction . . . the Contract Sum will be reduced as 
appropriate and equitable.”114 The parties do, it appears, contract into 
a free-floating standard; in the words of Scott and one of his co-authors, 
they delegate the task to the back end.115 That standard entails both a 
fault (willfulness, inadvertence) aspect and a monetary (market value, 
idiosyncratic value, cost of completion, perhaps jury whim) aspect.116 It 
is restricted to the class of cases in which the cost of completion exceeds 
the idiosyncratic value of the owner, for otherwise the owner could pay 
someone else to complete the project and have the original contractor 
pay. If the deviation were inadvertent, the outcome would likely be 
market value. The more egregious the contractor’s behavior, the greater 
the potential liability. Whether it would be capped by the final 
payment, as in the Kent contract, I cannot say. But the use of 
“appropriate and equitable” suggests that the contractor’s liability 
would increase the more willful or inappropriate its behavior. 
In effect this is Cardozo’s outcome. Cardozo seemed to suggest that 
willfulness would be an on/off switch while the form contract suggests 
 
112. American Inst. of Architects, Doc. A201 § 12.2.1.1 (1997) [hereinafter 
AIA 1997]. 
113.  Id. at §§ 2.4.1, 12.2.1.1, 12.3.1. 
114. Id. at § 12.3.1. (emphasis added). Schwartz and Scott cite the 1997 
version. Schwartz & Scott, Market Damages, supra note 4, at 1618 n.27. 
The most recent 2014 revision makes some changes (including the 
numbering), but the essential features for our purposes are the same. 
115. Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract 
Design, 115 Yale L.J. 814, 814 (2006) (“In deciding whether to express 
their obligations in precise or vague terms, contracting parties implicitly 
allocate costs between the front and back end. When the parties agree to 
vague terms (or standards) . . . they delegate to the back end the task of 
selecting proxies.”).  
116. See Schwartz & Scott, Market Damages, supra note 4, at 1631 (claiming that 
the courts routinely award market damages thereby short-changing owners 
with idiosyncratic taste). See also Leavitt & Rosenberg, supra note 108, at 
24–25 (suggesting that the burden of proof on proving subjective 
(idiosyncratic) rather than objective (market) losses would be on the owner). 
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it would be more like a dimmer.117 The significant point is that cost of 
completion is the remedy in the normal case in which the costs are 
actually incurred; the standard appears sufficiently flexible so that cost 
of completion would also be the remedy if the costs should have been 
incurred, but for some reason (perhaps liquidity concerns) they were 
not. When the costs were not incurred because the costs were signific-
antly greater than the benefits (either market value or idiosyncratic 
tastes), the loss would be restricted to the value unless the contractor’s 
behavior were sufficiently egregious; in that case, the award might be 
based on the cost of completion. 
So contrary to the Schwartz and Scott claim, the market evidence 
tends to support the Jacob & Youngs rule. If some of the defects are 
correctible but others, like Kent’s plumbing, are not, the remedy might 
entail a mix—completion costs for the remediable elements, value for 
the others. The casebook standard, Plante v. Jacobs,118 did use such a 
mix. For cabinet installation and similar problems the homeowner was 
awarded the cost of completion.119 But for the wall that was in the 
wrong place, off by a foot, the court looked to market value and 
concluded that the misplacement would have no effect on the value of 
the house.120  
B. The Architect’s Certificate 
The big puzzle for me was what happened to the architect’s 
certificate condition. The foregoing explains how it disappeared from 
the case. The rule of Nolan v. Whitney121 goes too far. The rule 
suggested in the venerable Harvard Law Review note, cited above, 
seems far more sensible: “[A]n honest refusal of the architect to give the 
certificate, no matter how mistaken he may be, debars the builder from 
 
117. In practice, I doubt that Cardozo would have confined willfulness to the 
on/off choice; more likely, he would have approved Corbin’s sliding scale. 
118. 103 N.W.2d 296 (Wis. 1960). 
119.  Id. at 299. 
120. See id. at 297–98 (“The plaintiff conceded he failed to furnish the kitchen 
cabinets, gutters and downspouts, sidewalk, closet clothes poles, and entrance 
seat amounting to $1,601.95. . . . The defendants especially stress the 
misplacing of the wall between the living room and the kitchen, which 
narrowed the living room in excess of one foot. The cost of tearing down this 
wall and rebuilding it would be approximately $4,000. The record is not clear 
why and when this wall was misplaced, but the wall is completely built and 
the house decorated and the defendants are living therein. Real estate experts 
testified that the smaller width of the living room would not affect the market 
price of the house.”). The court did not note whether the owner attempted 
to introduce evidence regarding any idiosyncratic value. Id. at 298. 
121.  88 N.Y. 648 (1882). 
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suing on the contract.”122 Proof of substantial performance might be 
relevant in building a case questioning the architect’s honesty, but the 
focus would have to be on the architect’s motive, not his competence. 
While Jacob & Youngs dealt with the architect’s unreasonable denial 
of a certificate, there is a symmetric problem—the unreasonable issuing 
of the certificate to the detriment of the owner. Indeed, if the owner 
were a one-shot player and the contractor a repeat player, the unreason-
able issuance of a certificate might be the more significant problem.123 
The law in most American jurisdictions embodies the “honest 
refusal” standard. However, the AIA standard contracts give a bit less 
deference to the architect. Thus, the standard form for contracts of 
“limited scope” which would include single family dwellings (A107) 
makes the architect’s certificate only one of three conditions precedent 
for final payment: “Final payment, constituting the entire unpaid 
balance of the Contract Sum, shall be paid by the Owner to the 
Contractor when the Work has been completed, the Contract fully 
performed, and a final Certificate for Payment has been issued by the 
Architect.”124 Both this document and AIA A201 (the more general 
building contract) say that the architect certificate is “final and 
binding.” However, the architect’s decision is not really final; it must 
be filtered through mediation and/or arbitration if one of the parties 
desired:  
The Architect will approve or reject Claims by written decision, 
which shall state the reasons therefor and which shall notify the 
parties of any change in the Contract Sum or contract time or 
both. The approval or rejection of a claim by the Architect shall 
be final and binding on the parties but subject to mediation and 
arbitration.125  
Claims regarding structural items would be subject to mediation/arbitr-
ation, but aesthetic or artistic claims would not be: “Any Claim arising 
out of or related to the Contract, except Claims relating to aesthetic 
effect . . . shall . . . be subject to arbitration. Prior to arbitration, the 
parties shall endeavor to resolve disputes by mediation.”126 So if Kent’s 
mansion had been built under the modern form contract, the architect’s 
decision to not produce the certificate would have been subject to  
122. Note, supra note 69, at 482. 
123. If the owner were a developer, then it too would be a repeat player. 
124. Bauer v. Klement, 458 N.W.2d 389 (Wis. 1990) (unpublished, at *1) 
(citing contract language that mirrors AIA A107); American Inst. of 
Architects, Doc. A107 § 15.5.1 (2007) [hereinafter AIA 2007]. 
125. AIA 1997, supra note 112, at § 4.4.5. (emphasis added); See also AIA 2007, 
supra note 124, at § 21.1 (providing for dispute resolution procedures). 
126. AIA 1997, supra note 112, § 4.6.1.  
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mediation and then arbitration.127 The additional layers of independent 
third parties make it extremely unlikely that nowadays the issue of 
architect unreasonableness would make its way to court. 
Conclusion 
Schwartz and Scott’s empirical study suggests that where the cost 
of completion greatly exceeds the market value of completion, American 
courts opt for the value remedy. They argue that restricting the buyer 
to a market value remedy creates a serious moral hazard problem. With 
a single price the seller (or builder) provides the buyer with two things, 
the promise to build and the promise to repair. By awarding the value, 
not the cost, the courts effectively ignore the second promise. A 
“prepaid seller’s incentive to invest efficiently in cost reduction is 
materially reduced if her damage exposure for failing to invest is capped 
by the market delta. Cost-of-completion damages in these cases thus 
function as an efficient deterrent against this moral hazard.”128 Even if 
the choice were confined to the two extreme measures, I think that the 
cost of completion in such cases is likely to result in overdeterrence, too 
much “defensive medicine”—a cost ultimately borne by purchasers. 
Schwartz and Scott reject that argument.129 Even if I were wrong about 
that, the choice should not be so restricted. Cardozo’s rule, and the rule 
spelled out in the basic building contract, is more nuanced. There is 
ample room for recognizing idiosyncratic values, and courts do have the 
freedom to take the builder’s behavior into account. Willfulness, or 
some other variant on deliberate misbehavior, gives the court an avenue 
for confronting the moral hazard problem. 
The House of Lords confronted the problem in Ruxley Electronics 
& Construction Ltd v. Forsyth.130 An in-ground swimming pool was 
supposed to have a maximum depth of seven and a half feet, but it was 
only six feet. The evidence showed that the pool was still safe for diving 
and that the effect on the market value was nil. The Court of Appeal 
reversed the trial judge and awarded the owner, Forsyth, the cost of 
reconstructing the pool (£21,560). While their Lordships disagreed over 
the wisdom of taking Forsyth’s subjective preferences into account, they 
did reinstate the trial judge’s decision that gave Forsyth damages for 
 
127. Both the Kent contract and the subcontractor contract included 
arbitration clauses, but apparently none of the parties opted for it. See 
Record, supra note 5, at 103–04, 115. 
128. Schwartz & Scott, Market Damages, supra note 4, at 1619. 
129. Id. at 1665–66. 
130. [1996] 1 AC 344 (HL) 366–67 (citing with approval Jacob & Youngs v. 
Kent). 
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loss of amenity, £2,500.131 Lord Mustill’s opinion explicitly rejected the 
choice between the two extremes: 
[T]here would indeed be something wrong if, on the hypothesis 
that cost of reinstatement and the depreciation in value were the 
only available measures of recovery, the rejection of the former 
necessarily entailed the adoption of the latter; . . . In my opinion 
however the hypothesis is not correct. There are not two 
alternative measures of damage, at opposite poles, but only one; 
namely, the loss truly suffered by the promisee. . . . As my Lords 
have shown, the test of reasonableness plays a central part in 
determining the basis of recovery, and will indeed be decisive in 
a case such as the present when the cost of reinstatement would 
be wholly disproportionate to the non-monetary loss suffered by 
the employer. But it would be equally unreasonable to deny all 
recovery for such a loss. The amount may be small, and since it 
cannot be quantified directly there may be room for difference of 
opinion about what it should be. But in several fields the judges 
are well accustomed to putting figures to intangibles, and I see 
no reason why the imprecision of the exercise should be a barrier, 
if that is what fairness demands. 
My Lords, once this is recognised the puzzling and paradoxical 
feature of this case, that it seems to involve a contest of absurd-
ities, simply falls away. There is no need to remedy the injustice 
of awarding too little, by unjustly awarding far too much. The 
judgment of the trial judge acknowledges that the employer has 
suffered a true loss and expresses it in terms of money.132 
The problems that arise when the cost of performance greatly 
exceeds the value recur in a variety of legal contexts. Cost of perform-
ance is roughly equivalent to giving one party a property rule protect-
ion, in Calabresi-Melamed terminology.133 If the value of performance  
131. See id. at 374–75. It appears that the judge just made up the number. 
Forsyth’s counsel did not attack the measure because he wanted to force 
the Lordships to choose between market value (zero) and cost of completion. 
Lord Lloyd of Bewick stated:  
 Forsyth was, I think, lucky to have obtained so large an award for 
his disappointed expectations. But as there was no criticism from 
any quarter as to the quantum of the award as distinct from the 
underlying principle, it would not be right for your Lordships to 
interfere with the judge’s figure.  
Id. at 374. 
132. Id. at 360–61. 
133. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability 
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 
1089, 1092 (1972) (discussing property rule protection). 
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to a buyer is trivial and the seller’s cost of performance great, the 
specific performance remedy gives the buyer great leverage.134 If a 
property owner erroneously erects a structure that encroaches by a few 
inches on the neighbor’s property, a rule that allows the neighbor to 
insist upon removal again gives that party substantial bargaining 
leverage. Likewise, if a party constructs a multimillion dollar factory on 
its property that creates a minor pollution problem on a neighbor, 
granting that neighbor an injunction would give that neighbor the 
ability to bargain for payments well in excess of the harm it suffers.135 
If the courts routinely rejected the property rule in such situations, 
opting instead for a liability rule, that would raise the same sort of 
moral hazard problem Schwartz and Scott observed. Rather than 
bargain for an easement, for example, the factory owner could simply 
build and pay court-determined damages. Courts have had difficulties 
coping with these problems, sometimes choosing the property rule and 
sometimes the liability rule. If one ignores questions of fault, intention, 
or willfulness, the pattern of opinions in these areas would make little 
sense. The source of the defendant’s vulnerability does matter, even if 
the court does not explicitly acknowledge it. Mark Gergen observed:  
In some jurisdictions, the law on remedies for takings, negligence, 
and nuisance contains a rule that limits damages when property 
is inadvertently or justifiably taken to the lesser of replacement 
cost and market value, and that limits damages when property is 
inadvertently or justifiably harmed to the lesser of repair cost and 
diminution in market value.136  
If, however, the taking or harm were advertent or unjustifiable, the 
“lesser of” rule need not apply. That is where Cardozo, Lord Mustill, 
and the AIA form contract come out. 
 
 
 
 
134. See, e.g., Walgreen Co. v. Sara Creek Prop. Co., B.V., 966 F.2d 273 (7th 
Cir. 1992). 
135. See, e.g., Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970). 
136. Mark P. Gergen, A Theory of Self-Help Remedies in Contract, 89 B.U. 
L. Rev. 1397, 1418 (2009). 
